We test whether markets are needed to mitigate the effects of anchoring on peoples' preferences. We anchor subjects by asking them if they are willing to sell a bottle of wine for a transparently uninformative random price. We elicit subjects' Willingness-To-Accept for the bottle before and after the market. Subjects either participate in a small or a large double auction market. The variance in subjects' Willingness-To-Accept shrinks within trading groups. Our evidence supports the idea that markets have the potential to mitigate a bias. However, the market is not needed: our anchoring manipulation failed in a large sample.
Introduction
In the recent past, a wealth of evidence has accumulated questioning some of the foundations of expected utility theory, and behavioral theorists have shown how these challenges can be accommodated (Wakker, 2010) . At the core of standard and behavioral economic modelling remains the assumption that people are endowed with well articulated and stable preferences.
This fundamental assumption, however, has also been challenged by psychologists, who have shown that preferences are initially malleable by normatively irrelevant anchors Ariely et al., 2003) . People subsequently choose consistently with these initial preferences, and thereby end up with preferences that are characterized by what Ariely et al. (2003) call "coherent arbitrariness". For a series of products that range from familiar (like an average bottle of wine) to unfamiliar (like listening to an unpleasant sound), they find substantial anchoring effects.
Economists often assign less weight to behavioral anomalies when they are obtained in nonrepeated individual decision making tasks. The line of reasoning is that anomalies may be eroded or mitigated when people have relevant experience, for instance as a result of trading in markets. To counter such skepticism, Ariely et al. (2003) included a treatment where subjects, after being exposed to an anchor, submitted a bid to avoid listening to an annoying sound. In the uniform-price sealed-bid auction, the three lowest bidders had to listen to the sound and each of them received a payment equal to the fourth lowest bid. Like in the individual decision making treatment, sizable (and lasting) anchoring effects were observed in this treatment. This paper makes two contributions. A first contribution is that we investigate the effects of uninformative anchoring on valuations in a large sample. This is important because previous papers have provided mixed evidence, from sizable anchoring effects (Ariely et al., 2003) to no anchoring effects (Fudenberg et al., 2012) . Our paper stands out because of the combination of two features. First, we have a large sample of 316 subjects who are all exposed to the same anchoring protocol, while previous studies have often been based on rather small samples.
Second, we use a transparently random anchor that subjects know to be uninformative because they generate it themselves with a ten-sided die.
A second contribution of our paper is that we investigate how preferences are affected in a richer market setting than the one of Ariely et al. (2003) , where subjects could not learn from others' bids during the auction. We employ a standard double auction market where traders are continuously updated about other traders' bids and asks. We believe that a double auction market provides a much better chance for market forces to erode initial traces of anchoring.
Our experiment consists of three phases. In the first phase, we apply a typical anchoring protocol: we ask whether subjects are willing to sell a bottle of wine for an individually drawn, random price. Then we elicit their valuation (Willingness-To-Accept) for the bottle of wine with the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure (Becker et al., 1964) . In the second phase, we randomly assign subjects to either a small double auction treatment (n=2) or a large double auction treatment (n=8). Subjects participate in two market periods, once as a buyer and once as a seller. In the third phase, we elicit each subject's valuation once more.
The first phase of the experiment allows us to test whether a random anchor influences valuations. We hypothesize that subjects' valuations correlate positively with their anchors.
Our conjecture is that market experience will affect subjects' preferences. Subjects who are not completely sure about their preference may move into the direction of the preferences exhibited by other market participants. This way, anchoring effects may diminish or even disappear.
Thus, we hypothesize that the valuations elicited in the third phase will exhibit smaller (if any) anchoring effects. We hypothesize that the large market will have a stronger effect on subjects' preferences than the small market, and that anchoring effects are eroded more efficiently in the former.
Contrary to our hypothesis, we observe no effect of the random anchor on subjects' valuations. Our null result contributes to the literature on the robustness of anchoring effects. In the discussion section, we position our paper in the literature and elaborate on what we can learn from our null result. We find support for the idea that market participation affects how people value the bottle. The variance in subjects' valuations after the market shrinks within matching groups. As expected, the effect of other traders' behavior on a subject's preference is stronger in the large market. These results underline the potential power that markets may play in eroding individual biases. However, in this study the double auction is not needed to avoid anchoring effects on valuations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental design and hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents the results of the experiment. Section 4 provides a discussion of how our results fit in the literature.
Experimental design and implementation
We pre-registered our study on the American Economic Association's registry for randomized controlled trials (Ioannidis et al., 2018) . 1 The experiment was run at the CREED communication Lab of the University of Amsterdam. The communication lab has 16 soundproof, closed cubicles. The experiment was programmed in oTree (Chen et al., 2016) . Subjects read the computerized instructions at their own pace (Appendix A). No communication was allowed during the experiment. Subjects were informed that they could earn money as well as a bottle of wine. It was explained that the experiment consisted of 3 phases during which they would make 5 decisions. Subjects knew that at the end of the experiment 1 of those 5 decisions would randomly be selected for payment. In phase I, subjects made 2 decisions, in phase II they made 2 decisions and in phase III made 1 decision. They only received the instructions of the next phase after a previous phase was finished.
There were two treatments which were varied between subjects. The Small market consisted of 2 subjects and the Large market of 8 subjects. In each session, we simultaneously ran the two treatments. Subjects were randomly assigned to the treatments.
Phase I was identical for both treatments. At the start of phase I, the experimenter entered each subject's cubicle with a 10 sided die (numbered from 0 to 9). Subjects determined their own random anchor by rolling the die twice. The first outcome was the integer part and the second was the decimal part of the anchor price. For example, if a subject rolled 6 and 4, the price was 6.4e. Hence, subjects knew that the anchor price was an uninformative draw in the range from 0e up to 9.9e. This procedure took place in the presence of the experimenter to guarantee that the subjects entered the correct numbers. 2 We used this procedure of subjects generating the anchor themselves to make it fully transparent to our subjects that the anchor price was truly random.
The first decision of phase I was the anchoring question. The subjects were endowed with a bottle of wine, a picture of which was shown to them on their screen. Consequently, they were asked whether they were willing to sell the bottle to the experimenter for a price that corresponded to the anchor price that they had just drawn. For the second decision of phase I, each subject was asked to submit the minimum price for which they were willing to sell the same bottle of wine. This Willingness-To-Accept decision (WTA) was incentivized via the BDM procedure. The application of the BDM procedure aimed at minimizing the chance that subjects form any kind of inference from the elicitation process itself. The instructions included a description of the BDM mechanism and emphasized that it is optimal to provide the true valuation of the bottle. The explanation did not include a numerical example as we did not want any number to operate as an additional anchor. For the same reason, the upper bound of the distribution from which the BDM price was drawn was not revealed. The subjects knew that a number would be randomly drawn between 0 and two times the (unknown) price of the bottle of wine in the store. To avoid outliers, we bounded the WTA from above. Subjects were given an error message if they entered a WTA above two times the price of the wine and were asked to resubmit their decision. 3 The message did not inform them of the actual upper bound, but simply stated that their price was higher than what the experimenters believe is a reasonable price for the wine. 4
In phase II, the market treatment was implemented. In the Large market, 8 subjects participated in a double auction with 4 buyers and 4 sellers. In the Small market, 2 subjects participated in a market with 1 buyer and 1 seller. In a typical session of 16 subjects, half were randomly assigned to 1 Large market and half to 4 Small markets. The market lasted for two periods. The group matching remained the same across the two periods, but buyer and seller roles were swapped. This way all subjects were exposed to both sides of the market before they continued to phase III.
Except for the number of traders, the market treatments were identical. Each seller was endowed with a bottle of wine and each buyer was endowed with an amount equal to the price of the bottle of wine that we paid in the store. Traders were unaware of the size of this amount.
At the end of the experiment, the amount was revealed only if the market decision was chosen for payment and only to buyers. 5 Buyers could submit bids to buy the bottle of wine. They 2 4 out of 316 subjects did not wait until the experimenter arrived and entered numbers of their own. 3 This message was shown to only 5 our of 316 subjects. 4 Bohm et al. (1997) showed that selling prices elicited via a BDM mechanism are sensitive to the upper bound of the BDM distribution. They use 3 treatments varying the bound, namely standard (market price), high (unrealistic price) and unspecified (upper bound as "not to exceed what we believe any real buyer would be willing to pay"). They observe no difference between the standard and unspecified, whereas bidding is higher in the high treatment. 5 We used different bottles of wine across sessions to avoid that prospective subjects could potentially learn the price from subjects that had participated already. could increase their bid multiple times, but not decrease (or withdraw) their current highest bid.
Sellers could submit asks to sell the bottle of wine. They could decrease their ask multiple times, but not increase (or withdraw) their current lowest ask. All bids and asks were automatically recorded in the Order Book, which was visible to everyone and updated in real time. A trade occurred automatically whenever any of the following two rules was satisfied. (i) When a buyer submitted a bid that was higher than or equal to the lowest ask of the sellers in the Order Book, this buyer bought from the seller with the lowest ask and the corresponding ask was the transaction price. (ii) When a seller submitted an ask that was lower than or equal to the highest bid of the buyers in the Order Book, this seller sold to the buyer with the highest bid and the corresponding bid was the transaction price. All realized trades and their corresponding prices were automatically recorded in the publicly visible Trade Book. Subjects who had already traded still saw live updated Order and Trade Books. Before the market opened, the subjects had to correctly answer 6 multiple choice questions to make sure they understood the rules of the market.
In phase III, we again elicited subjects' WTA for the bottle of wine with the BDM mechanism. After that, subjects were asked to complete a standard demographic survey asking for their age, gender and field of study. The experiment ended at this point and the final screen shown to the subjects informed them about which of the 5 decisions was chosen for payment and their payoff. If a WTA decision was implemented, they were informed of the random BDM draw and whether this random price meant that they sold the bottle of wine or kept it.
This design allows us to test the following hypotheses. To test them, we use the anchors to assign subjects to a High anchor group and a Low anchor group on the basis of either a median split or a quartile split. We use the data of phase I to test for anchoring.
Hypothesis 1. The WTA in the High anchor group is larger than the WTA in the Low anchor group.
We use the data of phases I and III to test whether the market affects subjects' preferences and alleviates the anchoring effect.
Hypothesis 2. The difference in WTA between the High and the Low anchor group is smaller in phase III than in phase I.
Hypothesis 3. The reduction in the difference in WTA between phase I and III is larger in the Large market treatment than the Small market treatment.
In total 316 subjects participated in the experiment, 160 in the Large market treatment (20 markets) and 156 in the Small market treatment (78 markets). The experiment lasted approximately 75 minutes. Depending on their decisions during the experiment, subjects received on average 12.17e including the participation fee of 8e (excluding the bottle of wine). On top of their payment, 160 of the subjects physically received a bottle of wine. Depending on the session the price of the bottle of wine was either 6.50e or 7.50e. Our subjects are on average 21 years old. A majority of (67%) are economics students uniformly spread across genders (females 53%, males 47%).
Results

Anchoring manipulation
In this subsection, we shed light on the question whether anchoring affects subjects' valuation of the bottle of wine. Figure 1 plots subjects' WTA in phase I as a function of their anchor.
The figure suggests that subjects' WTA is fairly independent of their anchor. Table 1 makes the results more precise. Hypothesis 1 states that the WTA in the group with high anchors will be larger than the WTA in the group with low anchors. First we do a median split of our data. Contrary to the hypothesis, the WTA for the Low anchor group does not significantly differ from the High anchor group. The evidence is in the expected direction, but, the effect size is very small and far from economically significant. The magnitudes of our anchoring effects as measured by the ratio of the valuations in the top and bottom part of the distribution varies between 1.04 (for the ratio of the quartiles) to 1.07 (for the ratio of the quintiles). 6 In comparison, for the series of products in Ariely et al. (2003) the ratio of top and bottom quintiles ranges from 2.16 to 3.03. The lack of support for an anchoring effect is further illustrated by a regression of the reported WTA on the anchor, which reveals a very small and highly insignificant slope (b = 0.021, p = 0.738, N = 316).
The previous literature has suggested some robustness checks. For instance, Fudenberg et al. (2012) include an analysis where they test for anchoring effects after leaving out inconsistent responses. We define a response as inconsistent if the WTA is higher than the anchor price that was accepted or lower than an anchor price that was rejected. In our sample, we have 51(16.14%) inconsistent observations from subjects resulting in a reduced sample size of 265.
Using rank sum tests, we find no anchoring effect for either the median split (ratio = 0.997, p = 0.811, N = 265) or quartile split (ratio = 1.027, p = 0.429, N = 135) or quintile split (ratio = 1.022, p = 0.460, N = 105). A regression of valuation on anchor reveals an insignificant slope (b = −0.012, p = 0.846, N = 265). Hence, focusing only on consistent answers does not affect our main result of no anchoring effects. Another approach that has been used in the literature is to replace valuations above the BDM range by the maximum of the BDM range. One reason to do so is that all reports higher than the BDM range yield the same outcome. So very high reports need not reflect very high valuations, which may bias the analysis. Ariely et al. (2003) and Maniadis et al. (2014) truncate valuations in this way and find that it does not affect their results. The same approach is not directly applicable for our study as our subjects did not know the exact range of the BDM, and higher valuations than the maximum were not allowed. However, in the same spirit we can investigate whether our results are sensitive to replacing valuations above 10 by 10, the highest possible anchor. Rank sum tests reveal no anchoring effects for median split (ratio = 1.077, p = 0.174, N = 316), quartile split (ratio = 1.081, p = 0.242, N = 163) and quintile split (ratio = 1.177, p = 0.201, N = 123). A regression confirms the result (b = 0.055, p = 0.276, N = 316). Hence, the truncation of valuations also does not qualify our null result.
Result 1. There is no anchoring effect in our data.
In light of this result, any analysis on whether market experience reduces anchoring effects is meaningless. Still, it remains interesting to investigate whether the market affects people's preferences. Previous work showed that markets can affect people's preferences for unfamiliar goods for which people might not have a clear initial preference to start with, such as tasting an unpleasant liquid and lotteries (Tufano (2010) and Isoni et al. (2016) ). It is not clear that markets can affect people's preferences for more familiar goods like a bottle of wine. For the remainder of the analysis, we group subjects on the the basis of their WTA instead of their anchor and reshape the remaining two hypotheses accordingly.
Market effect on valuations
In this Subsection, we provide evidence on how markets change preferences. First, we focus on the direction in which valuations change before and after the market. Second, we focus on whether subjects change their WTA more in the Large market than in the Small market.
To answer these questions, we define new groups based on the valuations. For each market separately, we use a median split of the WTA before the market to assign each subject to a Low or High WTA group. 7
Hypothesis 2 deals with the question whether the information revealed during the market affects the valuation of subjects. First we look at the mean WTA. If markets affect preferences, we would expect subjects with a high valuation before the market to reduce it after the market and the reverse for subjects with a low valuation before the market. We use a Wilcoxon signrank test to test how the WTA changes in each group. Figure 2 illustrates the results. We focus on the aggregate results of the Small and the Large market. It is clear that subjects' valuations move in the direction of the other group. Subjects in the Low WTA group decreased their valuation significantly by 0.61e (p-value<0.001, N=158) and in the high WTA group increased it significantly by 1.22e (p-value<0.001, N=158).
Figure 2: Average WTA before and after the market Second, we investigate whether the direction of change in WTA is not simply due to regression to the mean. If subjects noisily submit their valuation, then being classified in the High (Low) WTA group is correlated with a positive (negative) error. When subjects are again asked to report their WTA, subjects in the High (Low) WTA group will on average have a smaller (larger) error term than before and consequently report a lower (higher) WTA. To test whether the change is a statistical artifact, we compare for each subject the absolute difference between the WTA and the average WTA in their own trading group before the market with the same variable after the market. The average absolute difference is 2.06e before the market and 1.64e after the market. A Wilcoxon signrank test reveals that traders' WTA vary less after the market than before (p-value< 0.001, N=316).
Result 2. Subjects change their WTA in the direction of the average WTA in their own market.
7 If for example in the Small market, one subject submits a valuation of 1e and the other a valuation of 2e we classify the latter in the High WTA group, even though his WTA is low in comparison to the overall.
WTA's elicited before the market vary more within their trading group than WTA's after the market do.
We now turn to the question whether subjects change their preferences more in the Large market than in the Small market. Figure 2 also displays the results for each market separately.
In agreement with Hypothesis 3, we observe that the average decrease in WTA for the High WTA group is larger in the Large market than in the Small market. In contrast to Hypothesis 3, subjects in the Low WTA group increase their WTA to a somewhat larger extent in the Small market than in the Large market. To gauge the aggregate effect, we test whether the reduction in subjects' absolute distance from the average WTA in their matching group after the market participation is larger for the Large market than for the Small market. We find a reduction in absolute distance of 1.26e for the Large market versus 0.96e for the Small market. According to a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney ranksum-test, the difference is significant (p=0.043, N=316).
Another way to investigate the differential impact of the Large market on preferences is to estimate how much weight subjects assign to their own WTA in comparison to what they observe about the behavior of the others in the market. We test this in a regression that explains the WTA after the market by the WTA before the market and observed market information, with and without interaction term for the treatment. We define observed market information as the average of the last observed actions of the other market subjects. For market subjects that traded, the last observed action is the price they agreed on. For market subjects that did not trade, it is the last bid/ask they submitted. The results in Table 2 provide supportive evidence for the idea that subjects attach more weight to their own WTA in the Small market compared to the Large market. In the first two columns, we present regressions for each market separately and in the last column we present a regression with both markets and an interaction term.
Small
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Concluding discussion
In this paper we set out to answer the question if markets are needed to correct the effects of anchoring on valuations. We first discuss the potential of double auctions to correct individual biases. Our results suggest that the double auction is a good institution to test whether individual biases survive market forces. In our experiment, we find clear evidence for the hypothesis that market participation affects people's preferences. Subjects change their valuations in the direction of the others in their market, and we find that valuations within markets vary less after market participation. We also find evidence for the hypothesis that the preferences are changed to a larger extent in Large than in Small markets. The findings corroborate the results of Tufano (2010) and Isoni et al. (2016) who show that markets shape preferences for tasting an unpleasant liquid and preferences for lotteries, respectively. Our results show that markets not only change preferences for unfamiliar goods, goods where people might not have a clear preference to start with, but also for familiar goods. 8
However, in our study the market was not needed to correct an individual bias due to anchoring. We find no effect of anchoring on reported valuations. This result raises doubt on the robustness of the anchoring effect on people's preferences. Before we discuss differences in our design and other similar studies, we emphasize that our null result is not a consequence of an under-powered study. The observations of the first two sessions were used as a pilot to conduct a power analysis. We conducted a power analysis with an aim to obtain a significant result at the 5% level with 80% power in each of our market treatments separately. The power analysis resulted in an estimated sample size of 148 subjects per market treatment, so 296 subjects in total. To be on the safe side, we aimed for 320. Given that the anchoring hypothesis is based on the total sample (as no treatment has been introduced yet), we have a very high power of 99%.
The previous literature provides a mixed picture of whether anchors affect people's valuations. Table 3 lists previous studies on the anchoring of preferences, together with their main features and their finding for the effect of anchoring on valuations.
All these studies differ in some details in how they were run, and it is possible that anchoring effects on preferences occur in some circumstances but not in others. When trying to make sense of previous results on anchoring, a complicating factor is that many previous results are based on rather small samples which makes it impossible to distinguish between true results, false positives and false negatives. However, even the large studies provide mixed results.
One dimension in which studies differ is whether subjects' willingness-to-accept (WTA) or willingess-to-pay (WTP) is elicited. Ariely et al. (2003) find strong anchoring effects for valuations elicited with WTP, and initially there was some support for the idea that anchoring effects are more easily observed for WTP than for WTA. Simonson and Drolet (2004) find moderate anchoring effects for WTP and no anchoring effects for WTA. However, this idea is not supported in the more recent study of Fudenberg et al. (2012) . They find no anchoring 8 Our results do not shed light on the question whether the shaping of preferences is a rational process or not. In our experiment, subjects receive the same information of the bottle of wine, so from this perspective a rational decision maker would not be interested in trying to infer information from other people's bids or asks. Still, we cannot exclude that preferences for the wine are partly determined by an estimate of the price of the wine in the store, and that people use others' trading decisions to form a better estimate of the retail price. (9): The ratio is based on the median split. For grouped treatments, we present weighted average ratio (by treatment size). If all treatments find significant effects, we report the highest significance level. If some treatments find null effects and some do not, we denote the effects as Mixed (M). Another dimension in which studies differ is the familiarity of the product. Originally, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) investigated anchoring effects on judgments for topics that are quite unfamiliar for many people, such as the number of African countries in the United Nations, or the air distance from New Delhi to Beijing. It is quite plausible that anchoring effects occur more easily for unfamiliar than familiar judgmental tasks. Likewise, people's preferences may be more affected by anchors when they value unfamiliar products for which they do not have well-articulated preferences. So far, the evidence does not support this conjecture. Ariely et al. (2003) find large anchoring effects for both familiar and unfamiliar products. Fudenberg et al. (2012) find no anchoring effects, neither for people's preferences for common goods (such as chocolates and a chordless mouse) nor for their valuations of lotteries for which they lack daily life experience. Alevy et al. (2015) find very limited support for anchoring for novel goods and no support for goods for which people have experience.
One factor that stands out is the anchoring procedure. The studies differ in the extent to which the anchor may have been perceived as informative about price of the good. It is not surprising that anchors that convey information of the value of a product can affect people's preferences. One such example is provided by Jung et al. (2016) , who investigate the effect of a default anchor on people's donation in a Pay-What-You-Want pricing scheme. Naturally, a default may be perceived as a recommended donation. In a series of field experiments, they find mixed effects of anchoring on preferences. They do observe anchoring effects when the anchors are distant enough in terms of their percentile rank in the distribution of valuations.
There are also studies that intended to provide an uninformative anchor which may unintentionally have been interpreted as informative by subjects. One such approach is to let a subject's anchor be determined by the last 2 digits of their social security number (SSN) (e.g., Ariely et al. (2003) , Bergman et al. (2010) ). About one-third of the subjects of Chapman and Johnson (1999) mention that they thought that the SSN anchor was informative. Likewise, Yoon and Fong (2019) anchoring effects only when the anchor is plausible. These findings furnish our conjecture that the anchoring effects on subjects' valuations in the large studies of Table 3 are driven by the possibility that subjects (unintentionally) inferred information from the anchors.
Studies that use a randomly generated anchor, and clearly communicate the whole procedure to subjects, do not find anchoring effects. Similar to our experiment, subjects in Fudenberg et al. (2012) are anchored with the help of a random number from 0 to 99 created by hitting "Enter" on Microsoft Excel, and are aware of the randomness of the procedure. Like us, they find no systematic effects of anchoring on valuations. The weighted average of ratios of the anchoring effect is 1.40 for studies that use default anchors, versus 1.39 for studies with an ambiguous anchor (indicated by a ? in the Table) and 1.03 for studies with an uninformative anchor. With our sample size, we would be able to detect a ratio level of 1.26 with a power level of 99%. Hence, we are sufficiently powerful to detect a ratio as big as the average among the studies that found anchoring effects.
The uninformative anchoring of preferences, if it exists at all, has so far proven to be a rather elusive phenomenon. If anchoring of preferences only somewhat reliably appears when subjects perceive the anchor as informative, then it may be less appropriate to think of the anchoring of preferences as a bias.
9 They instructed their subjects about the anchoring in the following way: "First, we will ask whether you would like to buy the item at a particular price. That price will be determined randomly by having you convert the numbers on the card you received into a whole-dollar price."
10 Yoon et al. (2019) vary some details of the anchoring procedure and find similar anchoring effects for SSN anchors and their randomly generated anchors. Their study further rejects the possibility that conflicting results are due to other procedural differences, such as the recruiting method (classroom vs. email recruiting), or the cover story (in-class market research demonstration vs. participation in research experiment). Welcome to this experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. We ask that you do not communicate with other participants during the experiment. The use of mobile phones is not allowed during this experiment. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, at any time, an experimenter will assist you privately. The data collected through this experiment does not include your name or any other information that would allow your identification. All of the data you provide during the experiment cannot be traced back to you.
Your earnings in today's session will consist of money and/or a bottle of wine. You will start the experiment with a capital of €8.0. Besides this starting capital, your earnings will depend on your own decisions and may depend on other participants' decisions.
The bottle of wine is Piccini Chianti. The bottle of wine is different in every session of this experiment.
In this experiment you will make 5 decisions in total.
At the end of the experiment, one of your 5 decisions will be selected at random. Only this decision will determine your earnings (possibly in combination with the decisions of other participants). Your earnings for this decision will be added to your starting capital of €8.0. You will privately receive your earnings at the end of the experiment.
For each decision you will receive some instructions. You will only receive the instructions of a subsequent decision if a previous decision is completely finished.
Thank you for your participation.
Next
Appendix A Experiment Instructions
For this part of the experiment, you are required to roll a 10-sided die twice and report the outcomes. The outcomes will be converted to a price that you will see in the next page. The price is constructed in the following way: the first roll is the integer (euros) part and the second roll is the decimal part of the price you will see. Please remain seated and the experimenter will come to your room with the die shortly.
Next
Submit the outcome of first die roll and click Submit.
Submit
Submit the outcome of second die roll and click Submit.
Please confirm that your rolls where 6 and 2.
Confirm
If the outcomes were different, please click Resubmit.
Resubmit
The outcomes of the rolls are registered. The corresponding price is €6.2. The experiment will continue shortly after the experimenter leaves the room. Please wait.
Proceed
You are given the bottle of wine. You are asked to report the lowest price (rounded to the nearest 10 cents) for which you are willing to sell the bottle of wine to the experimenter. The lowest price is the one that makes you indifferent between keeping the bottle and selling it.
Submit
Please confirm that your price was 8.2€. Confirm If you'd like to change the price, please click Resubmit. Resubmit
You will now participate in a market running for 2 periods. In this market, every participant is a trader. The item for trade is the same bottle of wine. The duration of each period of the market is 300 seconds.
Roles
In the first period of the market, every participant is assigned to the role of either a buyer or a seller. There are 4 buyers and 4 sellers in the market. In the second period of the market, all participants will change role.
Buyers
Each buyer is endowed with an amount equal to the price of the bottle of wine that we paid in the store. The size of this amount will be revealed to you only if it affects your payoffs.
Sellers
Each seller is endowed with a bottle of wine.
Offers
All the Bids and Asks will automatically be recorded in the Order Book, which is visible to all participants in the market.
Trades
When a trade occurs, it gets automatically recorded in the Trade Book, which is visible to everyone. The buyer and the seller that traded will receive a message informing them about the trade as well. They can no longer submit offers, but they continue to see the liveupdated offer book and trade book.
Rules
The rules of the market are presented in the next page.
Next
Buyers
Buyers are asked to submit the price they are willing to pay for the bottle of wine. Offers submitted by the buyers are called Bids. Buyers can increase their bid multiple times, but not decrease (or withdraw) their current bid.
Sellers
Sellers are asked to submit the price they are willing to accept for the bottle of wine. Offers submitted by sellers are called Asks. Sellers can decrease their ask multiple times, but not increase (or withdraw) their current ask.
Trades
A trade occurs automatically whenever any of these two rules are satisfied.
You are a buyer. Your bid is the second highest bid. You increase your bid and become the highest bidder. Your current bid is lower than the lowest ask.
Does this action result in a trade for you? And if yes, at which price?
Yes, for a price equal to buyer's bid Yes, for a price equal to the seller's ask No You are a seller. You want to submit an ask higher than your current ask.
Is this ask allowed?
Yes No
You are a seller. Your ask is the lowest ask. Your current ask is higher than the highest bid. You decrease your ask below the highest bid.
Does this action result in a trade for you? And if yes, at which price?
Earnings If a trade occurs, the seller receives the transaction price, while the buyer receives the bottle of wine and the transaction price is subtracted from his/her endowment. If a seller does not trade, the seller keeps the bottle of wine. If a buyer does not trade, the buyer keeps his/her endowment.
Please answer the questions on the right to make sure you fully understand the rules of the market.
Yes, at a price equal to buyer's bid Yes, at a price equal to the seller's ask No You are a buyer. Your bid is the highest bid. Your bid is lower than the lowest ask. A seller decreases his/her ask below your bid.
Yes, at a price equal to buyer's bid Yes, at a price equal to the seller's ask No You are a seller. Your ask is the second lowest ask. A buyer increases his/her bid above your ask.
Yes, for a price equal to buyer's bid Yes, for a price equal to the seller's ask No You are a buyer. You want to submit a bid higher than your current bid.
Is this bid allowed?
Yes No
Click the "Check" button below to check your answers. You can only proceed to the next page if you have answered all questions correctly.
Check
When a buyer submits a bid that is higher than or equal to the lowest ask of the sellers in the Order Book, this buyer buys from the seller with the lowest ask and the corresponding ask is the transaction price. When a seller submits an ask that is lower than or equal to the highest bid of the buyers in the Order Book, this seller sells to the buyer with the highest bid and the corresponding bid is the transaction price.
Buyer
The buyer is asked to submit the price he/she is willing to pay for the bottle of wine. Offers submitted by the buyer are called Bids. The buyer can increase his/her bid multiple times, but not decrease (or withdraw) his/her current bid.
Seller
The seller is asked to submit the price he/she is willing to accept for the bottle of wine. Offers submitted by the seller are called Asks. The seller can decrease his/her ask multiple times, but not increase (or withdraw) his/her current ask.
Trades
When the buyer submits a bid that is higher than or equal to the ask of the seller in the Order Book, the buyer buys from the seller and the seller's ask is the transaction price. When the seller submits an ask that is lower than or equal to the bid of the buyer in the Order Book, the seller sells to the buyer and the buyer's bid is the transaction price.
Earnings
If a trade occurs, the seller receives the transaction price, while the buyer receives the bottle of wine and the transaction price is subtracted from his/her endowment. If a seller does not trade, the seller keeps the bottle of wine. If a buyer does not trade, the buyer keeps his/her endowment.
You are the buyer. Your bid is lower than the seller's ask. You increase your bid. Your current bid is lower than the ask. Does a trade take place? And if yes, at which price?
Yes, for a price equal to buyer's bid Yes, for a price equal to the seller's ask No You are the seller. You want to submit an ask higher than your current ask. Is this ask allowed?
Yes No
You are the seller. Your current ask is higher than the buyer's bid. You decrease your ask below the buyer's bid.
Does a trade take place? And if yes, at which price?
Yes, at a price equal to buyer's bid Yes, at a price equal to the seller's ask No You are the buyer. Your bid is lower than the seller's ask. The seller decreases his/her ask below your bid.
Yes, at a price equal to buyer's bid Yes, at a price equal to the seller's ask No You are the seller. Your ask is higher than the buyer's bid. The buyer increases his/her bid. Your ask is still higher than the current bid.
Yes, at a price equal to buyer's bid Yes, at a price equal to the seller's ask No You are the buyer. You want to submit a bid higher than your current bid. Is this bid allowed?
Yes No
Check
Time left to the end of the market: 3:55 You are a seller in the market.
You agreed to trade for a price of 6.5€. Please wait until the auction is over.
You are a buyer in the market.
You agreed to trade for a price of 6.5€.
Please wait until the auction is over. You are a buyer in the market.
Submit Bid
Your current bid is 0.8€.
You are a seller in the market.
Submit Ask
Your current ask is 11.2€. You agreed to trade for a price of 8.65€. Please wait until the auction is over.
Period 1 of the market is now over.
In period 1, you did not agree on a trade.
The market will start again shortly. In the next period of the market, you will be a buyer.
Next
The market will start again shortly. In the next period of the market, you will be a seller.
In period 1, you were a buyer and bought the bottle of wine for €6.5.
In period 1, you were a seller and sold the bottle of wine for €6.5.
Next Please indicate your age.
Please indicate your field of study.
Economics
Social Sciences (Non-economics)
Natural Sciences
Humanities Applied Sciences
Other Please indicate your gender.
Male
Female
Prefer not to answer
Next
Thank you for your participation in the experiment. Your starting capital was €8.0.
Additionally, Decision 1 was randomly chosen for payment. You were endowed with the bottle of wine.
You reported you wanted to sell the bottle of wine to the experimenter for €6.2. Hence, you receive €6.2 from the sale of the bottle of wine.
Your total payment is €14.2.
Please remain seated. The experimenter will come to your cubicle for the payment. After that you may leave the room. Please remember to pick your personal belongings that you stored in the lockers.
You reported you did not want to sell the bottle of wine to the experimenter for €2.1. Hence, you receive no money, but you get to keep the bottle of wine.
Your total payment is €8.0. You will also receive the bottle of wine.
